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[1191] 
Say-on-Pay with Bite: Shareholder Derivative 
Suits on Executive Compensation 
Louis Truong*
The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 mandated 
shareholder advisory voting for executive compensation in public corporations. This 
vote, known as “say-on-pay,” enables shareholders to provide input on the size and 
nature of executive compensation packages. The impetus behind mandating say-on-pay is 
the concern that corporate executive pay has grown increasingly excessive. To that end, 
say-on-pay has not been successful, as the first three years of voting have not produced a 
significant effect on executive pay. However, the voting results have suggested changes in 
other ways, indicating that shareholders can be influenced in the decisionmaking process 
for executive pay.  
 
 
Due to the advisory nature of say-on-pay, shareholders have few methods of recourse in 
the event that a corporation chooses to ignore shareholder input. Shareholders generally 
lack sufficient power to influence corporations and their boards. Shareholders have had 
little success through litigation, as courts have been reluctant to consider a say-on-pay 
vote as the basis for establishing demand futility, a pleading requirement for shareholder 
derivative suits.  
 
This Note argues that a say-on-pay vote should be sufficient for establishing demand 
futility in limited circumstances. Courts should apply a stricter standard of judicial review 
when directors ignore a say-on-pay vote, placing the onus on the directors to show that 
they properly considered the vote, and that the compensation packages for executives 
were reasonable. Enabling shareholders to use the threat of litigation provides extra 





 * J.D. Candidate, University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 2014; B.A., University 
of California, Los Angeles, 2010. I would like to thank Professor John Crawford for his guidance 
during the course of the writing process, as well as my family and friends for their unwavering support 
throughout law school. I would also like to thank the editors of the Hastings Law Journal for all of the 
time and effort they put into making this Note semi-intelligible.  
M - Truong_10 (TEIXEIRA) (Do Not Delete) 5/26/2014 10:52 AM 
1192 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 65:1191 
Table of Contents 
Introduction .............................................................................................. 1192 
I.  Background on Executive Compensation ....................................... 1194 
A. Growth of Executive Pay .................................................... 1194 
B. Explanations for the Growth of Executive Pay ............ 1195 
II.  Background on Say-on-Pay .............................................................. 1197 
A. Shareholder Primacy ............................................................ 1197 
B. Say-on-Pay Prior to Dodd-Frank ....................................... 1198 
III.  Say-on-Pay Under Dodd-Frank ..................................................... 1201 
A. The Results of Dodd-Frank Say-on-Pay .......................... 1202 
1. The First Year: 2011 .......................................................... 1202 
2. Subsequent Years: 2012–13 ............................................... 1204 
3. Implications of the Voting Results ................................... 1206 
IV.  Say-on-Pay and Shareholder Derivative Suits .......................... 1208 
A. Background on Shareholder Derivative Suits ............... 1208 
B. Results of Say-on-Pay Derivative Suits ........................... 1211 
1. Cincinnati Bell ................................................................... 1212 
2. Plaintiffs’ Lack of Success in Other Cases ...................... 1213 
C. Analysis & Recommendations ............................................. 1215 
Conclusion ................................................................................................ 1219 
 
Introduction 
Executive pay has long been a source of controversy, and in recent 
years, some have attributed the housing bubble and subsequent financial 
crash in the United States to executive compensation. Judge Richard 
Posner noted that a “particularly insidious effect of executive 
overcompensation . . . is the incentive it imparts to CEOs to ride a bubble 
until it bursts.”1 The higher the pay to CEOs, and the more that pay is 
tied to the price of the company’s stock, the more CEOs are incentivized 
to maximize profits in the short run.2 This explains why CEOs were much 
more willing to engage in risky overleveraging of debt during an 
economic bubble.3
The criticism aimed at executive pay practices after the financial 
crash was not merely a matter of hindsight. A study of Fannie Mae’s 
executive pay arrangements, conducted by Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse 
Fried several years before the housing bubble burst, revealed serious 
 
 
 1. Richard A. Posner, Are American CEOs Overpaid, and, If So, What If Anything Should Be 
Done About It?, 58 Duke L.J. 1013, 1041 (2009). 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. 
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flaws at the company.4 The study found that Fannie Mae’s compensation 
arrangements incentivized executives to report higher earnings regardless 
of whether those reports were misstated and to offer generous retirement 
packages regardless of overall performance failure.5 Such practices were 
not atypical; to the contrary, they were “representative of prevailing 
compensation practices in public companies.”6
Historically, shareholders have had little say on executive pay . This is 
largely because shareholders have little incentive to be active in internal 
matters concerning the corporation. As a general rule, shareholders are 
considered to be “rationally apathetic” because the effort that is required 
to make informed decisions is much greater than the benefits, which are 
low, because most shareholders have too small of a stake in the 
corporation to have any influence in making changes.
 
7 Due to their 
inability to effect change, shareholders typically adhere to the so-called 
“Wall Street Rule”: that it is easier to sell their shares than it is to fight.8
In response to the financial crisis, President Obama signed the Dodd-
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”) 
into law in 2010, resulting in the most significant reform to the financial 
regulatory system since the Great Depression.
 
Accordingly, shareholders who may be critical of the pay executives 
receive have no reason to push for change because they have little power 
to do so. Shareholders opposed to the current executive pay regime are 




 4. See generally Lucian A. Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, Executive Compensation at Fannie Mae: A 
Case Study of Perverse Incentives, Nonperformance Pay, and Camouflage, 30 J. Corp. L. 807 (2005). 
 This Note examines one of 
the provisions designed to provide shareholders with input on executive 
compensation: the ability to vote to either approve or disapprove of 
executive pay packages, otherwise known as “say-on-pay.” While say-on-
pay has triggered significant changes to how executives are paid, there 
are few repercussions for corporations that choose to ignore shareholder 
demands. Shareholders who bring derivative suits against corporate 
directors for failing to consider the votes have been unsuccessful getting 
past the motion to dismiss stage of litigation because courts are reluctant 
to consider a failed vote as the basis for demand futility, a procedural 
 5. Id. at 807–08. 
 6. Id. at 822. 
 7. Stephen M. Bainbridge, The New Corporate Governance in Theory and Practice 56–57 (2008). 
 8. Id. at 202–03. 
 9. Brian Montopoli, Obama Signs Sweeping Financial Reform into Law, CBS News (July 21, 
2010, 2:23 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-503544_162-20011201-503544.html. For a synopsis of 
the history of U.S. financial regulatory reforms, see Wenzhong Zhu & Shen Rui, The Historical 
Dimension of the US Dodd-Frank Bill and Its Implications to the Financial Governance Reform in 
Emerging Markets, 5 iBusiness 146, 147–48 (2013). 
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requirement for derivative suits.10
Part I of this Note discusses background on executive compensation, 
including the considerable rise of executive pay over the past three 
decades, as well as arguments regarding changes in how executives are 
paid. Part II surveys the history of say-on-pay prior to Dodd-Frank. 
Part III discusses the results of say-on-pay under Dodd-Frank. While say-
on-pay has not managed to lower executive pay during the first two years 
of voting, it has resulted in significant changes in the relationship between 
shareholders and the corporation. Part IV examines say-on-pay derivative 
suits and concludes that courts should find failed say-on-pay votes, in 
certain contexts, to be sufficient to survive motions for dismissal. 
 This Note argues that a failed say-on-
pay vote, particularly one that relied on a proxy advisory firm’s 
recommendation to reject a board’s pay proposal, should be sufficient to 
excuse pre-suit demand for a derivative suit. Courts should begin to apply 
enhanced scrutiny to situations in which a company’s board of directors 
ignored the say-on-pay vote. This would present such situations as 
compelling evidence that would rebut the business judgment rule as 
required under the Delaware Aronson test to establish demand futility. 
I.  Background on Executive Compensation 
The primary impetus behind say-on-pay and other rules directed at 
corporate pay packages is the perception that executive compensation 
has grown increasingly excessive. That belief has long been a source of 
public outrage and controversy.11
A. Growth of Executive Pay 
 Whether that perception reflects reality 
has been an area of dispute among academics and lawmakers, as 
discussed below. Before say-on-pay is further discussed, it is helpful to 
understand the trends of executive pay over the years and the arguments 
over whether changes to compensation are necessary. 
Although executive compensation has been a contentious issue 
since the 1930s, the rapid growth trends of today only began in the mid-
1970s.12 Since then, growth rates in executive pay have soared.13
 
 10. Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., 500 U.S. 90, 108–09 (1991) (establishing the requirement 
of demand futility).  
 In 
monetary terms, the average salary for CEOs of Standard & Poor’s 500 
 11. See Harwell Wells, “No Man Can Be Worth $1,000,000 a Year”: The Fight over Executive 
Compensation in 1930s America, 44 U. Rich. L. Rev. 689, 690 (2010) (stating that the issue of excessive 
compensation in the U.S. arose first during the 1930s). 
 12. Carola Frydman & Raven E. Saks, Executive Compensation: A New View from a Long-Term 
Perspective, 1936–2005, 23 Rev. Fin. Stud. 2099, 2100 (2010). 
 13. Id. at 2106–07. 
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companies, adjusted for inflation, increased from $3.7 million in 1993 to 
$17.4 million in 2000.14
This rise in the growth rate of CEO compensation would perhaps 
not be so alarming if pay also increased for employees of these CEOs’ 
companies. But this is not the case. CEO pay increased from twenty 
times the average employee pay in 1965 to nearly fifty-six times the 
employee pay in 1989 and 106.9 times the pay in 1999.
 
15 For large 
companies, the ratio of CEO pay to average employee pay was even 
more pronounced. In 1991, CEOs of large companies were paid 140 times 
the average employee pay.16 The ratio skyrocketed in the twenty-first 
century, with CEOs making 500 times employee pay in 2003.17
B. Explanations for the Growth of Executive Pay 
 The 
significant rise in executive pay, then, is not simply the result of the pie 
growing bigger in size; rather, the executives’ slice of the pie seems to have 
grown larger, and significantly so, at the expense of the employees’ slice. 
While it is undeniable that executive compensation has increased 
significantly in recent decades, the debate continues over whether the 
rise in pay is justifiable in terms of firm success or economic conditions. 
Bebchuk and Yaniv Grinstein argue that this substantial growth in 
executive compensation cannot be explained simply by firm size, 
performance, and industry trends because only “the relationship between 
pay and firm attributes has changed substantially.”18
Some scholars argue that competition is one explanation for the rise 
in CEO pay. Xavier Gabaix and Augustin Landier argue in a recent 
influential article that the “sixfold increase in CEO pay between 1980 
and 2003 can be attributed to the sixfold increase in market capitalization 
of large U.S. companies during that period,” showing that CEO pay 
increases with the size of the firm.
 Other economists 
and legal academics have also attempted to explain the enormous rise in 
pay awarded CEOs in a number of ways. 
19
 
 14. Lucian Bebchuk & Yaniv Grinstein, The Growth of Executive Pay, 21 Oxford Rev. Econ. 
Pol’y 283, 285 (2005). 
 Charles Yablon contends that the 
trend toward more transparency and disclosure in regards to executive 
 15. Lynne L. Dallas, Short-Termism, the Financial Crisis and Corporate Governance, 37 J. Corp. 
L. 265, 321 (2012). 
 16. Lucian Bebchuk & Jesse Fried, Pay Without Performance: The Unfulfilled Promise of 
Executive Compensation 1 (2004) [hereinafter Bebchuk & Fried, Pay Without Performance]. 
“Large” companies refers to those listed on the Standard & Poor’s 500. Id. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Bebchuk & Grinstein, supra note 14, at 289. 
 19. Xavier Gabaix & Augustin Landier, Why Has CEO Pay Increased So Much?, 123 Q. J. Econ. 
49, 50 (2008). 
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compensation has actually increased the amount that CEOs are paid.20 
According to Yablon, boards tend to believe that their CEO is at least 
“above-average” and use the disclosed information to give their CEO 
above-average pay, leading to a “ratcheting up” of compensation paid to 
CEOs.21 Kevin Murphy and Jan Zabojnik argue that the increase in CEO 
pay has been driven “by an increase in the importance of general skills, 
as opposed to firm-specific knowledge, in managing the modern 
corporation.”22 As a result, firms have competed with one another to 
make external CEO hires, offering higher pay to attract outside talent.23
A significant explanation for the rise in executive pay arises from 
the “agency problem.” The agency problem results from the separation 
of ownership and management that characterizes the corporate structure 
of publicly traded American firms.
 
24 The owners (the shareholders) of 
the corporation are not in a position to regularly monitor the actions of 
the corporation’s management (the executives).25 Accordingly, those 
managers have substantial discretion over how the corporation is run.26 
This dynamic creates an agency relationship, where the managers act as 
agents on behalf of the corporation’s shareholders.27 This relationship 
creates the potential that managers will take actions that are not in the 
best interests of the shareholders because the interests of the manager-
agents do not always align with those of the shareholder-principals.28
In the context of compensation, executives are thus in a position to 
exercise their discretion to benefit themselves financially at the expense 
of the corporation and its shareholders. The agency problem arises from 
the relationship between management and supervision of management 
by the corporation’s board of directors,
 
29
Advocates of the Board Capture theory, or Managerial Power 
Perspective, argue that negotiations are not the result of arm’s-length 
bargaining because the executives have effectively taken control over, or 
 which has the authority to 
negotiate and approve compensation packages. 
 
 20. Charles M. Yablon, Is the Market for CEOs Rational?, 4 N.Y.U. J.L. & Bus. 89, 113 (2007) 
(reviewing Bebchuk & Fried, Pay Without Performance, supra note 16). 
 21. Id. at 112. See John M. Bizjak et al., Does the Use of Peer Groups Contribute to Higher Pay 
and Less Efficient Compensation?, 90 J. Fin. Econ. 152, 153 (2008) (finding in a study of one hundred 
Standard & Poor’s 500 firms’ compensation committee reports in 1997 that the “vast majority” of firms 
pegged compensation at or above the median). 
 22. Kevin J. Murphy & Ján Zábojník, CEO Pay and Appointments: A Market-Based Explanation 
for Recent Trends, 94 Am. Econ. Rev. 192, 195 (2004). 
 23. Id. 
 24. Adolf A. Berle, Jr. & Gardiner C. Means, The Modern Corporation and Private 
Property 110–11 (1934). 
 25. Bebchuk & Fried, Pay Without Performance, supra note 16, at 15. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. at 16. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. at 17. 
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captured, the board of directors.30 These advocates assert that 
compensation arrangements often deviate from arm’s-length contracting 
due to management’s control over the directorial nomination process. 
Therefore, directors have an incentive to comply with the wishes of the 
managers.31 Other factors further incentivize directors to comply with the 
managers’ wishes. Bebchuk and Fried argue that “because being on the 
company’s slate is the key to being appointed, developing a reputation for 
haggling with the CEO over compensation would hurt rather than help a 
director’s chances of being invited to join other companies’ boards.”32 
Additionally, “limitations on time and resources have made it difficult for 
even well-intentioned directors to do their pay-setting job properly.”33 As a 
result, managers are able to obtain rents, or benefits that surpass what 
would have been feasible under normal arm’s-length bargaining.34
Such explanations for the rise in executive pay suggest that 
shareholders can and should have a role not only in keeping executive 
pay from growing too excessively, but also making the executive pay-
setting process more efficient. Part II discusses one of the components of 
Dodd-Frank that is intended to accomplish these objectives: say-on-pay. 
 
II.  Background on Say-on-Pay 
A. Shareholder Primacy 
The idea that shareholders can influence executive compensation is 
based in part on a theory known as “shareholder primacy,” which 
prioritizes the value of shareholders’ interest in the corporation.35 
According to the theory, maximizing the value of the shareholders’ 
interest maximizes the value of the corporation itself.36
 
 30. See Randall S. Thomas & Harwell Wells, Executive Compensation in the Courts: Board Capture, 
Optimal Contracting, and Officers’ Fiduciary Duties, 95 Minn. L. Rev. 846, 852 (2011). An arm’s-length 
transaction refers to one “between two parties who are not related or not on close terms and who are 
presumed to have roughly equal bargaining power.” Black’s Law Dictionary 123 (9th ed. 2009). 
 The theory is based 
 31. Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem, 17 J. 
Econ. Persp. 71, 73 (2003) [hereinafter Bebchuk & Fried, Agency Problem]. In contrast, advocates of 
the Optimal Contract theory contend that executive compensation is generally a matter of efficient 
negotiations due to arm’s-length bargaining and market constraints that inhibit misconduct during the 
negotiation process. See Omari Scott Simmons, Taking the Blue Pill: The Imponderable Impact of 
Executive Compensation Reform, 62 SMU L. Rev. 299, 315 (2009). Although they do not completely 
reject the Optimal Contract theory, adherents of the Board Capture theory contend that the 
“departures [from optimal outcomes in directions favorable to managers] are substantial and that 
optimal contracting alone cannot adequately explain compensation practices.” Bebchuk & Fried, 
Agency Problem, supra, at 73. 
 32. Bebchuk & Fried, Agency Problem, supra note 31, at 74. 
 33. Bebchuk & Fried, Pay Without Performance, supra note 16, at 4. 
 34. Id. 
 35. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Economic Structure of Corporate 
Law 36 (1991). 
 36. Id. 
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on the agency relationship described above: the managers act as agents 
of the shareholder-principals. But given the separation of ownership and 
management, the shareholders are really not the “owners” of the 
corporation, but one group out of many that contract with the corporate 
entity.37 Unlike the other contractual parties to the firm—such as creditors, 
suppliers, or employees—the shareholders are residual claimants to the 
firm’s income.38 This means that shareholders do not receive their returns 
on the firm until the other contracting parties do. As the claimants to the 
residual income, shareholders are the only parties with “the appropriate 
incentives . . . to make discretionary decisions” because they “receive 
most of the marginal gains and incur most of the marginal costs.”39
Voting, or the ability to exercise discretion, enforces shareholder 
primacy by incentivizing managers to act in the interest of the 
shareholders.
 In 
other words, the other contracting parties collect a set amount of income 
from the firm regardless of the firm’s performance. Because shareholder 
income is dependent on the remaining funds, shareholders are incentivized 
to make the appropriate discretionary decisions on behalf of the firm in 
order to maximize the firm’s performance and subsequent wealth. 
40 Managers act in the interests of shareholders because 
shareholders monitor their actions, and can vote at any time to oust 
management.41
B. Say-on-Pay Prior to Dodd-Frank 
 Thus, a say-on-pay vote may have the ability to influence 
how executives are paid because failing to consider the input of 
shareholders on compensation matters could lead to serious retribution 
against management. Below, this Note examines how say-on-pay has 
been implemented prior to Dodd-Frank, including its conception in the 
United Kingdom. 
Adoption of say-on-pay in the United States was influenced largely 
by the United Kingdom’s experience with the practice.42 In 2002, the 
United Kingdom was the first country to adopt rules for advisory 
shareholder voting on executive compensation.43
 
 37. Id. at 67. 
 Say-on-pay has not yet 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. at 68. But see Bainbridge, supra note 7, at 70 (“[S]hareholders have no meaningful voice 
in corporate decision making. In effect, shareholders have but a single mechanism by which they can 
‘negotiate’ with the board: withholding capital.”). 
 40. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 35, at 68–69. 
 41. Id. But see Bainbridge, supra note 7, at 15–16 (“[S]hareholder voting is properly understood 
not as an integral aspect of the corporate decision-making structure, but rather as an accountability 
device of last resort to be used sparingly, at best.”). 
 42. Fabrizio Ferri & David A. Maber, Say on Pay Votes and CEO Compensation: Evidence from 
the UK, 17 Rev. Fin. 527, 528 (2013). 
 43. Id. at 527. 
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impacted the growth rate of executive pay,44 and less than a dozen 
companies have received negative votes in the six years since the rule was 
enacted.45 However, Fabrizio Ferri and David Maber’s empirical study 
found that say-on-pay has “pressure[d] firms to remove controversial pay 
practices” and link pay closer with performance.46
Such controversial pay practices included generous severance 
packages, as reflected most visibly in the case of GlaxoSmithKline in 2003. 
There, the pharmaceutical company CEO’s golden parachute,
 
47 which 
would have entitled the chief executive to an additional $23.7 million in 
salary and stock upon resignation or termination, was rejected in a tight 
vote.48 While the advisory vote did not mandate that GlaxoSmithKline 
make any changes, the following year the company drastically cut the 
size of the severance package in order to gain shareholder approval.49 
But more importantly, the GlaxoSmithKline affair produced a 
fundamental change in the relationship between companies and their 
shareholders. Shortly thereafter, “companies and shareholders that never 
used to talk to each other over [compensation policies have begun to 
engage] in a constructive, not a hostile, but a constructive and regular 
annual dialogue on this important issue.”50
Prior to Dodd-Frank, shareholders introduced say-on-pay in the 
United States pursuant to Securities Exchange Commission (“SEC”) Rule 
14a-8, which governs shareholder proposals.
  
51 In 2006, the American 
Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees introduced say-on-
pay resolutions on seven shareholder ballots in the United States.52
 
 44. Id. at 554. 
 
 45. Jeffrey N. Gordon, “Say on Pay”: Cautionary Notes on the U.K. Experience and the Case for 
Shareholder Opt-In, 46 Harv. J. on Legis. 323, 343 (2009). 
 46. Ferri & Maber, supra note 42, at 530. 
 47. Golden parachutes refer to “agreements between a corporation and its top officers which 
guarantee those officers continued employment, payment of a lump sum, or other benefits in the event 
of a change of corporate ownership.” Schreiber v. Burlington N., Inc., 472 U.S. 1, 3 n.2 (1985). Golden 
parachutes are often criticized because they “unjustifiably waste corporate assets and create perverse 
performance incentives.” Richard P. Bress, Golden Parachutes: Untangling the Ripcords, 39 Stan. L. 
Rev. 955, 955 (1987). 
 48. Heather Timmons, Glaxo Shareholders Revolt Against Pay Plan for Chief, N.Y. Times, May 
20, 2003, at W1. Shareholders rejected the pay package by a margin of 50.72% to 49.28%. Id. 
 49. GSK Gets Approval for Pay Deals, BBC News (May 17, 2004, 8:02 PM), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/3723151.stm. 
 50. Empowering Shareholders on Executive Compensation: H.R. 1257, The Shareholder Vote on 
Executive Compensation Act: Hearing Before the Comm. on Fin. Services, 110th Cong. 14 (2007) 
(statement of Stephen M. Davis); Stephen Davis, Millstein Ctr. for Corp. Governance & 
Performance, Yale Sch. of Mgmt., Does ‘Say on Pay’ Work? Lessons on Making CEO 
Compensation Accountable 10 (2007). 
 51. Randall S. Thomas et al., Dodd-Frank’s Say on Pay: Will it Lead to a Greater Role for 
Shareholders in Corporate Governance?, 97 Cornell L. Rev. 1213, 1218 (2012). 
 52. Empowering Shareholders on Executive Compensation: H.R. 1257, The Shareholder Vote on 
Executive Compensation Act: Hearing Before the Comm. on Fin. Servs., 110th Cong. 10 (2007) (statement of 
Richard Ferlauto, Dir. of Pension & Benefit Policy, Am. Fed. of State, Cnty. & Mun. Emps.). 
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Although all seven proposals failed to receive a majority vote, it was not 
long before voters approved such measures.53 The following year, 
shareholders voted to approve say-on-pay at Activision, Blockbuster, Par 
Pharmaceuticals, Ingersoll-Rand, Motorola, Verizon, and Clear Channel 
Communications.54 In the same year, the pension fund Teachers Insurance 
and Annuity Association-College Retirement Equities Fund became the 
first entity to offer a say-on-pay vote to policyholders.55 In 2008, Aflac 
became the first publicly traded company to offer say-on-pay for 
shareholders.56
Prior to Dodd-Frank, Congress made several attempts to pass say-
on-pay legislation. In 2005, Representative Barney Frank introduced the 
Protection Against Executive Compensation Abuse Act of 2005, which 
would have amended the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to mandate a 
say-on-pay vote.
 Such piecemeal efforts were the only feasible method of 
enacting say-on-pay, as legislative attempts to pass say-on-pay at the 
federal level continuously failed to gain traction. 
57 Frank attempted legislation twice more, in 200758 and 
2009,59 but ultimately, none of his bills were brought to a vote. In the 
Senate, Senator Charles Schumer introduced a bill in 2009.60
In 2009, Congress finally adopted a limited version of say-on-pay, 
which only reached financial firms that received federal aid under the 
Troubled Asset Relief Program (“TARP”).
 Like its 
counterpart in the House, the Senate never voted on the bill. 
61 The American Recovery 
and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (the federal stimulus plan) also required a 
say-on-pay vote for companies that had outstanding TARP debt.62 These 
efforts by Congress occurred in response to public criticism that TARP 
funds were being used to pay out executive bonuses.63 However, this 
version of say-on-pay appears to have had little to no impact on 
compensation for companies subject to the vote. By the end of 2009, 
virtually every company that received TARP funds received shareholder 
approval on executive pay packages.64
 
 53. Shareholder Advisory Votes on Executive Compensation—A “Say on Pay” Primer, Compensia 
(June 22, 2009), http://www.compensia.com/tp_alerts/ThoughtfulPay_SayOnPay_0609.pdf. 
 
 54. Id. 
 55. Claudia H. Deutsch, Aflac Investors Get a Say on Executive Pay, a First for a U.S. Company, 
N.Y. Times, May 6, 2008, at C3. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Protection Against Executive Compensation Abuse Act, H.R. 4291, 109th Cong. (2005). 
 58. Shareholder Vote on Executive Compensation Act, H.R. 1257, 110th Cong. (2007). 
 59. Corporate and Financial Institution Compensation Fairness Act, H.R. 3269, 111th Cong. (2009). 
 60. Shareholder Bill of Rights Act of 2009, S. 1074, 111th Cong. (2009). 
 61. 12 U.S.C. § 5221(e) (2009). 
 62. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115 (2009). 
 63. Thomas et al., supra note 51, at 1222. 
 64. Of the public companies that received TARP funds, 237 out of 282 disclosed results of the 
say-on-pay vote; of the 237 disclosing companies, all received shareholder approval. Cari Tuna, 
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The voting results seem to be independent of the firm’s performance 
over the year, as evident in the case of Flagstar Bancorp, Inc., a publicly 
traded savings bank headquartered in Troy, Michigan.65 Despite the fact 
that the stock price of the firm dropped from $6.94 in 2007 to $0.71 in 
2008, and that the firm’s CEO received a $1.5 million cash bonus “on 
account of 2008 performance,” ninety-nine percent of its shareholders 
voted to approve the executive pay package.66 The results from the 2010 
proxy season did not show any significant difference, as shareholders 
approved pay proposals at TARP-funded companies by an average of 
nearly eighty-nine percent of the vote.67
III.  Say-on-Pay Under Dodd-Frank 
 
Section 951 of Dodd-Frank mandated say-on-pay for public 
corporations by amending section 14A of the Securities Exchange Act, 
which empowered the SEC to promulgate rules requiring shareholder 
votes on executive compensation.68 The language of the statute provides 
that at least “once every 3 years, a proxy or consent or authorization for 
an annual or other meeting of the shareholders for which the proxy 
solicitation rules of the Commission require compensation disclosure 
shall include a separate resolution subject to shareholder vote to approve 
the compensation of executives.”69 Say-on-pay under Dodd-Frank 
applies to the company’s CEO as well as the executives named in the 
company’s proxy compensation table.70
 
Investors Say ‘Yes’ on Pay at TARP Firms, Wall St. J. (Sept. 2, 2009, 12:59 PM), 
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB125190043514279681. 
 The statute also requires 
shareholder voting on the frequency of the say-on-pay vote and the 
approval of golden parachute compensation in the event of an 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Thomas et al., supra note 51, at 1224. 
 68. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 951, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended at 
15 U.S.C. § 78n-1). 
 69. Id. (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78n-1(a)(1)). Shareholder voting procedures can be 
summarized as follows: “Under American corporate law, shareholders vote on company affairs in two 
main instances: they elect the board of directors and vote on proposals by management and fellow 
shareholders. Shareholder voting occurs predominately by proxy in advance of the company’s annual 
meeting. Shareholders, in response to the company’s proxy materials, grant a proxy for their shares to 
vote in a designated manner on a slate of candidates for the board and either up or down on a series of 
proposals by management and, in certain instances, proposals by other shareholders.” See Michael S. 
Kang, Shareholder Voting as Veto, 88 Ind. L.J. 1299, 1305–06 (2013). 
 70. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-21(a) (2011). Under Item 402(b) of Regulation S-K, companies prior to a 
say-on-pay vote must “[d]iscuss the compensation awarded to, earned by, or paid to the named 
executive officers[;] . . . explain all material elements of the registrant’s compensation of the named 
executive officers[; and] . . . describe . . . [h]ow the registrant determines the amount . . . for each 
element to pay.” Id. § 229.402(b)(1). 
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acquisition or merger.71 Interestingly, the statute also expressly 
pronounces that shareholder votes under the section are not to be 
construed “to create or imply any additional fiduciary duties for such 
issuer or board of directors.”72
A. The Results of Dodd-Frank Say-on-Pay 
 As discussed below, this provision has 
largely prevented shareholders from using the courts to redress their 
grievances after a failed say-on-pay vote. 
1. The First Year: 2011 
In 2011, the first year of mandatory shareholder voting under Dodd-
Frank, the results seemingly showed that say-on-pay had little effect on 
executive compensation. For the 2011 proxy season, shareholders 
overwhelmingly approved of compensation proposals, while only thirty-six 
Russell 3000 companies73 failed to receive majority support.74 
Additionally, nearly seventy-five of Russell 3000 companies prevailed on 
their say-on-pay vote with over ninety percent approval.75 The 2011 
results led one commentator to opine that “if the goal of these [say-on-
pay efforts] is a reduction in compensation, the results are quite 
disheartening.”76
But on closer review, the 2011 results may indicate a significant 
change in executive pay. While actual compensation figures have not 
declined, say-on-pay has appeared to significantly change corporate 
behavior and the relationship between corporate officials and 
shareholders. Commentators have argued that mandatory say-on-pay in 
its first year has “catalyzed greater management attention to shareholder 
concerns, an increased shareholder interest in voting on corporate 
governance, and a broader dialogue on pay issues between management 
and shareholders (and proxy advisory firms).”
 
77
There are several explanations for the discrepancy between the 
voting results and its actual impact. According to one study, many 
 According to this view, 
the numbers have not fully reflected the actual impact of say-on-pay. 
 
 71. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 951, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended at 15 
U.S.C. § 78n-1(a), (b)). 
 72. Id. (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78n-1(c)(3)). 
 73. The Russell 3000 is a stock market index that measures the 3000 largest U.S. public companies 
based on total market capitalization, representing approximately ninety-eight percent of the investable 
U.S. equity market. Russell 3000 Index, Russell, http://www.russell.com/indexes/data/fact_sheets/ 
us/russell_3000_index.asp (last visited Apr. 24, 2014). 
 74. A Study of the Changes from a Failed 2011 Say on Pay Vote, Equilar (Jan. 13, 2014), 
http://www.equilar.com/corporate-governance/2013-reports/a-study-of-the-changes-from-a-failed-
2011-say-on-pay-vote. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Steven M. Davidoff, Efforts to Rein in Executive Pay Meet with Little Success, N.Y. Times, 
July 13, 2011, at B7. 
 77. Thomas et al., supra note 51, at 1256. 
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companies, prior to the 2011 proxy season and in anticipation of say-on-
pay voting, preemptively made changes to their pay programs to better 
align pay with performance.78 Changes often included eliminating non-
performance-based pay elements such as excise tax gross-ups, executive 
perquisites, and large severance arrangements.79 Similarly, some 
companies revised their pay programs after failing a prior vote, as in the 
cases of Occidental Petroleum and KeyCorp, two companies that 
voluntarily placed say-on-pay on the ballot in 2010.80 The subsequent pay 
revisions experienced great success, winning shareholder approval in 
2011 with 91.3% and 86.7% of the vote, respectively.81 In 2012, 
compensation levels decreased significantly for companies that failed 
their 2011 vote.82 Changes made by these companies in regard to 
executive pay suggest that companies “affirmatively react to [a failed] 
vote by reducing the level of increase of their executive compensation.”83
Say-on-pay has also significantly impacted the level of communication 
between companies and their shareholders. Companies began to revise 
their Compensation Discussion & Analysis disclosures, using them not as 
“simply a compliance exercise,” but also to “tell their story and provide a 
clear business rationale for their compensation decisions.”
 
84 Companies 
that received negative recommendations from Institutional Shareholder 
Services (“I.S.S.”) “increase[d] their communication with shareholders and 
re-evaluate[d] their compensation and corporate-governance practices.”85
Perhaps the most interesting effect of say-on-pay voting during the 
2011 proxy season has been management’s response to failed votes. For 
most of the Russell 3000 companies that failed their votes, these 





 78. Russell Miller & Yonat Assayag, SOP Drives Compensation Program Changes to Enhance 
Pay/Performance Link, Director Notes, Sept. 2011, at 2. The study analyzed the first 100 proxy filings 
made by Fortune 500 companies. 
 For example, Stanley Black & Decker “significantly 
raised the minimum stock ownership required of its executive officers,” 
 79. Id. 
 80. Thomas et al., supra note 51, at 1259. 
 81. Id. 
 82. See Marinilka B. Kimbro & Danielle Xu, Shareholders Have a Say on Executive 
Compensation: Evidence from Say-on-Pay in the United States 32 (Apr. 2013) (unpublished 
manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2209936. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Miller & Assayag, supra note 78, at 2. 
 85. Thomas et al., supra note 51, at 1259. Institutional Shareholder Services (“I.S.S.”) is the largest 
and most influential of the proxy advisory firms, which “specialize in advising pension funds and mutual 
funds, for a fee, how to vote the proxies of the shares held in their investment portfolios.” Iman Anabtawi 
& Lynn Stout, Fiduciary Duties for Activist Shareholders, 60 Stan. L. Rev. 1255, 1277 (2008). 
 86. Equilar, supra note 74. According to the report, all thirty-six companies “made at least one 
change to their compensation or governance policies in response to the vote” and twenty companies 
“cited shareholder outreach as an important action to be taken following the vote.” Id.  
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and required executives “to hold on to stock options or restricted shares 
they receive for a year after they are granted.”87 In addition, the company 
ended its practice of “gross-up,” for which severance agreements with 
executives would force the company to cover their tax bills.88 Such 
changes help explain why, of the Russell 3000 companies that failed their 
2011 votes, all but four received shareholder approval in 2012.89
The vote was an impetus in changing pay policies at companies that 
did not even fail their vote, as demonstrated by Johnson & Johnson.
 
90 
The company received majority support, but made changes to its pay 
plan after nearly forty percent of its shareholders voted to reject the 
plan.91 Johnson & Johnson made changes to its long-term incentive 
program for its executives, replacing some cash incentives with stock 
awards that vest only after three years and after goals related to 
shareholder returns are met.92 According to the company’s proxy 
statement, those changes were made “as a result of what [they] learned in 
2011.”93 The company eliminated cash payments for long-term incentives, 
instead awarding “stock units that vest only over three years and after 
meeting three goals aligned with shareholder returns.”94
2. Subsequent Years: 2012–13 
 Such changes for 
companies that did not fail their say-on-pay vote provide strong support 
for the premise that even though there was no major shareholder revolt 
against executive pay, say-on-pay has had a meaningful impact. 
Corporate governance experts believed that it could be more difficult 
during the 2012 proxy season for executive pay policies to pass muster with 
shareholders because institutional investors had more opportunity to study 
pay proposals.95 This thought seemed to be confirmed when fifty-five 
percent of Citigroup shareholders voted against the firm’s pay package.96
 
 87. Gretchen Morgenson, A Rich Game of Thrones: At Last, Signs That Shareholders Are Making 
Their Voices Heard, N.Y. Times, Apr. 8, 2012, at BU1. 
 
 88. Id. 
 89. The four Russell 3000 companies that failed their say-on-pay vote in both years were Hercules 
Offshore, Kilroy Realty, Tutor Perini, and Nabors Industries. See Semler Brossy, 2012 Say on Pay 
Results: Russell 3000 Year-End Report 2 (2012) [hereinafter Semler Brossy, 2012 Results]. 
Kilroy Realty, Nabors Industries, and Tutor Perini have also failed their say-on-pay votes in 2013. 
Semler Brossy, 2013 Say on Pay Results: Russell 3000 Year-End Report 1 (2013) [hereinafter 
Semler Brossy, 2013 Results]. 
 90. Dena Aubin & Ross Kerber, Analysis: Citi’s Pay Rejection a Wake-Up Call to Boards, 
Reuters (Apr. 18, 2012, 6:22 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/04/18/us-citigroup-pay-
idUSBRE83H1GC20120418. 
 91. Id. 
 92. See id.; see also Morgenson, supra note 87. 
 93. Morgenson, supra note 87. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Aubin & Kerber, supra note 90. 
 96. Id. 
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Shareholders followed the recommendation of the proxy advisory firm 
I.S.S., which advised shareholder rejection of the company’s pay policy 
due to the size and nature of CEO Vikram Pandit’s compensation 
package.97 I.S.S. recommended that shareholders vote against Pandit’s 
pay “because parts of his awarded pay were not based on Citigroup’s 
financial performance, Citigroup stock had declined by more than 90 
percent in the last five years and Mr. Pandit’s pay package was not in 
alignment with that of his peers.”98 According to Steven Davidoff, 
Citigroup’s “pay vote is likely to invite more federal regulatory scrutiny. 
It may even push regulators to act given that I.S.S.’s report was quite 
vocal in asserting that Mr. Pandit’s pay was untethered to Citigroup’s 
actual performance.”99 Given the stature of Citigroup, one of the largest 
financial services corporations in the country, the vote seemed to be the 
beginning of a shareholder revolt against executive pay.100
The shareholder revolt has not yet materialized, however, and the 
ultimate ramifications of Citigroup’s vote are still unclear. Moreover, the 
voting results of the 2012 and 2013 proxy seasons did not differ 
substantially from the year before for most Russell 3000 companies. By 
the end of the year, fifty-seven Russell 3000 companies failed their votes, 
approximately 2.6% of companies that placed say-on-pay on their 
ballots.
 
101 Of the Russell 3000 companies that passed their vote, 73% 
passed with over 90% shareholder approval and 91% that passed did so 
with over 70% shareholder approval.102 The 2013 proxy season had similar 
results, as 91% of Russell 3000 companies passed their vote with over 70% 
shareholder approval, and 77% passed with over 90% approval.103
Similar to the first year of voting, the subsequent years tended to 
show overwhelming shareholder support for firms’ executive pay 
packages.
 
104 But like the 2011 results, the numbers alone do not tell the 
full story. As was the case in 2011, many companies chose to place more 
stringent rules on their pay policies prior to voting.105
 
 97. Steven M. Davidoff, Citigroup Has Few Options After Pay Vote, N.Y. Times Dealbook (Apr. 12, 
2012, 12:38 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/04/18/citigroup-has-few-options-after-pay-vote. 
 For example, 
companies have begun to place “clawback” clauses into their 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
 100. See Robert Reich, Citigroup Shareholders Revolt. Will CEO Pay Drop?, Christian Sci. 
Monitor (Apr. 18, 2012), http://www.csmonitor.com/Business/Robert-Reich/2012/0418/Citigroup-
shareholders-revolt.-Will-CEO-pay-drop (“Institutional investors are catching on to a truth they 
should have understood years ago: When executive pay goes through the roof, there’s less money left 
for everyone else who owns shares of the company.”). 
 101. Semler Brossy, 2012 Results, supra note 89, at 2. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Semler Brossy, 2013 Results, supra note 89, at 1. 
 104. Id.; Semler Brossy, 2012 Results, supra note 89, at 2. 
 105. See Gillian Brianna White, Results Mixed on Shareholder ‘Say on Pay’ for Top Executives, 
Medill Rep. (June 7, 2012), http://news.medill.northwestern.edu/chicago/news.aspx?id=206654. 
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compensation agreements, which allow companies to take back 
performance or incentive-based pay if an executive does not meet the 
firm’s ethical standards.106
Such significant changes to pay packages occurred at prominent 
companies. Morgan Stanley, which first implemented clawback clauses in 
2011, expanded the ways in which those clawbacks could be triggered.
 
107 
The firm now has the ability “to pull back compensation on all long-term 
incentive payment and executive pay can be taken back or cancelled for 
additional reasons, including substantial losses and the failure to 
adequately manage.”108 Yahoo!, as a result of poor say-on-pay results in 
2011 and 2012, implemented a new pay program for executives, 
eliminating minimum funding levels for annual incentives and promoting 
long-term incentives by providing bonuses based on performance 
metrics.109 In 2013, Yahoo! passed its say-on-pay vote with ninety-four 
percent shareholder approval, which was a substantial increase from 2011 
and 2012, when the company received fifty percent and sixty-nine percent 
approval, respectively.110
3. Implications of the Voting Results 
 All three years of say-on-pay have resulted in 
near-universal support for executive compensation packages. However, 
as the Morgan Stanley and Yahoo! examples suggest, the results have not 
reflected the significant changes that firms have imposed on executive 
pay as result of say-on-pay. 
The results of say-on-pay voting have so far indicated that 
shareholders are taking their votes seriously. The first empirical study of 
say-on-pay, by Marinilka Kimbro and Danielle Xu, describes that the first 
two years of mandatory say-on-pay “show a great degree of shareholder 
sophistication in recognizing the monitoring and reward tools that need to 
coexist between owners and firm managers.”111 In reviewing say-on-pay 
votes for Russell 3000 companies in 2011 and 2012, Kimbro and Xu 
found that failed votes were often associated with poor firm performance 
and abnormal compensation policies.112 The results indicated a “very 
strong and statistically significant relationship between returns, 
performance and [say-on-pay] votes” with firms with low returns and 
returns on assets more likely to fail their vote.113
 
 106. Id. 
 With regard to pay 
(particularly equity compensation as opposed to cash compensation), 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Semler Brossy, 2013 Results, supra note 89, at 2. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Kimbro & Xu, supra note 82, at 10. 
 112. Id. at 23–24. 
 113. Id. at 34. 
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higher levels of compensation were associated with lower approval 
votes.114 Kimbro and Xu conclude that even though say-on-pay was only 
advisory in nature, the voting results indicated that say-on-pay was 
effective in improving corporate governance because “shareholders are 
‘doing their homework’ and are carefully discerning and identifying 
relevant issues that should be linked to executive compensation. . . . 
[S]hareholders are voting down excessive compensation packages of 
firms with low returns, high return volatility, poor financial performance 
and low quality accounting.”115
The results also strongly indicate that proxy advisory firms have had 
a significant influence on shareholders regarding say-on-pay voting. Like 
the Citigroup situation, proxy advisory firms recommended that 
shareholders reject pay proposals, and shareholders seemed to follow 
suit.
 This suggests that shareholders have 
begun to take a substantially more active role in the affairs of the firm. 
116 Even where proxy advisory firms recommended a “no” vote and 
shareholders ultimately disagreed, the level of shareholder support for 
pay proposals have been significantly lower.117 According to one study of 
the 2012 voting results, when I.S.S. recommends a rejection for a pay 
proposal, the average shareholder vote has been sixty-five percent in 
favor; when I.S.S. recommends support, the average approval has been 
ninety-five percent.118 Another study concluded that while the evidence 
has not been found to be either positive or negative for shareholders, it 
does “clearly show that companies do respond to the [say-on-pay] 
policies adopted by proxy advisory firms.”119
The majority of companies determine in advance whether their 
executive compensation programs are likely to receive a favorable 
recommendation from ISS or Glass Lewis; and companies are likely to 
make changes to a program in anticipation of a negative 
recommendation from these firms. All areas of the compensation 
program are affected, including disclosure, guidelines, and plan 
structure and design.
 This is because: 
120
 
 114. Id. 
 
 115. Id. at 4, 10. 
 116. See Nell Minow, More Shareholders Are Just Saying No on Executive Pay, Bloomberg 
(July 19, 2012, 3:30 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-07-19/more-shareholders-are-just-
saying-no-on-executive-pay.html (stating that of the first fifteen firms that failed their say-on-pay vote, 
fourteen were also subject to recommendations to vote no by I.S.S.). 
 117. Id. 
 118. John D. England, Say on Pay Soul Searching Required at Proxy Advisory Firms, Pay 
Governance (June 20, 2012), http://paygovernance.com/say-on-pay-soul-searching-required-at-proxy-
advisory-firms. The 2011 results were less pronounced: when I.S.S. recommended that shareholders 
decline a proposal, the average vote was seventy percent in favor; when I.S.S. recommended a 
proposal, the average vote was ninety-five percent in favor. Id. 
 119. David F. Larcker et al., The Influence of Proxy Advisory Firm Voting Recommendations on 
Say-on-Pay Votes and Executive Compensation Decisions, Director Notes, Mar. 2012, at 6. 
 120. Id. 
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As discussed below,121 the emergence of these firms in recent years has 
helped to substantially transform the role of shareholders and shareholder 
votes in corporate governance.122
To summarize, the first three years of say-on-pay, while not having 
the effect of lowering executive pay, have shown that shareholders can 
be influential in the decisionmaking process regarding executive pay. 
However, shareholders armed with say-on-pay voting have few options if 
the directors choose to ignore a failed say-on-pay vote. In terms of 
litigation, at least one putative class action has been filed against a 




IV.  Say-on-Pay and Shareholder Derivative Suits 
 Part IV examines the shareholder derivative suit, 
which shareholder plaintiffs have frequently used against corporations in 
connection to failed say-on-pay votes. 
The first few years of say-on-pay have demonstrated that 
shareholders can have a meaningful impact on executive compensation. 
Shareholders have few methods of recourse, however, in the event that a 
corporation chooses to ignore shareholder input because shareholders 
generally do not have sufficient power to influence corporations and 
their boards. Shareholders have recently resorted to litigation in order to 
hold corporations that fail their say-on-pay votes accountable.124 This 
Part examines shareholder derivative suits, which allow shareholders to 
compel the corporation to sue directors who breach their fiduciary 
duties. In the context of say-on-pay, shareholders can sue directors who 
breach their fiduciary duties by disregarding failed votes and refusing to 
modify executive compensation packages.125
A. Background on Shareholder Derivative Suits 
 However, derivative suits 
have stringent pleading standards, and as discussed below, shareholders 
in say-on-pay suits have struggled to get past the pleading stage. 
The main rationale for the development of shareholder derivative 
suits is the central tenet that the directors, and not the shareholders, 
manage the corporation.126
 
 121. See infra Part IV.C. 
 As such, the directors have a fiduciary duty to 
 122. See, e.g., Versata Enters., Inc. v. Selectica, Inc., 5 A.3d 586, 602 (Del. 2010); Yucaipa Am. 
Alliance Fund II v. Riggio, 1 A.3d 310, 355 (Del. Ch. 2010); Stephen J. Choi et al., Director Elections 
and the Role of Proxy Advisors, 82 S. Cal. L. Rev. 649, 696–97 (2009). 
 123. See, e.g., Morrison v. Hain Celestial Grp., Inc., 971 N.Y.S.2d 391 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2013). 
 124. Thomas et al., supra note 51, at 1262 (“Fear of litigation following a failed say-on-pay vote has 
led corporate advisers to recommend that firms change the CEO performance evaluation process, thus 
positioning the company to avoid a negative vote or to defend against such a lawsuit.”). 
 125. Id. at 1261. 
 126. See, e.g., Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2013) (“The business and affairs of every corporation 
organized under this chapter shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of directors.”). 
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the corporation and its shareholders, requiring “an undivided and 
unselfish loyalty to the corporation [that] demands that there shall be no 
conflict between duty and self-interest.”127 To provide a method of 
redress for shareholders against a disloyal board, the “derivative action 
developed in equity to enable shareholders to sue in the corporation’s 
name where those in control of the company refused to assert a claim 
belonging to it.”128
A derivative suit enables a shareholder to sue a third party on behalf 
of the corporation.
 
129 As the real party of interest in a derivative suit, any 
monetary recovery from the suit is directed toward the corporation.130 
Thus, shareholders can benefit indirectly from their ownership stake in the 
corporation.131 Shareholders file a derivative suit in order “to protect their 
long-term interest in the company by imposing corporate governance and 
management changes.”132
The derivative suit is not an all-powerful tool for shareholders, 
however. The ability to bring a derivative action “is limited to situations 
where either the stockholder has demanded the directors pursue a 
corporate claim and the directors have wrongfully refused to do so, or 
where demand is excused because the directors are incapable of making 
an impartial decision regarding whether to institute such litigation.”
 
133 
The demand requirement is based on the recognition that the directors 
manage the corporation, and the “very nature [of] the derivative action 
impinges on” the directors’ ability to do so freely.134 Thus, the 
requirement “exists at the threshold, first to insure that a stockholder 
exhausts his intracorporate remedies, and then to provide a safeguard 
against strike suits.”135 Plaintiffs generally plead demand futility because 
to make a demand on the board would cede control of the suit, and thus 
its fate, to the board.136
 
 127. Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939). 
 After the plaintiff makes a demand, the board 
 128. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 811 (Del. 1984). 
 129. Id. 
 130. See Ross v. Bernard, 396 U.S. 531, 538 (1970) (“The corporation is a necessary party to the 
action; without it the case cannot proceed. Although named a defendant, it is the real party in interest, 
the stockholder being at best the nominal plaintiff.”). 
 131. Jessica Erickson, Corporate Misconduct and the Perfect Storm of Shareholder Litigation, 84 
Notre Dame L. Rev. 75, 81 (2008). 
 132. William Alan Nelson II, Esq., Ending the Silence: Shareholder Derivative Suits and Amending 
the Dodd-Frank Act so “Say on Pay” Votes May Be Heard in the Boardroom, 20 U. Miami Bus. L. 
Rev. 149, 157 (2012). 
 133. Stone ex rel. AmSouth Bancorporation v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 366–67 (Del. 2006). 
 134. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 811 (Del. 1984). 
 135. Id. at 811–12. A strike suit is typically “a securities fraud suit or shareholder derivative action 
brought without a good faith belief in prevailing on the merits and advanced only for settlement 
value.” Christopher M. Fairman, Heightened Pleading, 81 Tex. L. Rev. 551, 564 n.111 (2002). 
 136. Randall S. Thomas & Kenneth J. Martin, Litigating Challenges to Executive Pay: An Exercise 
in Futility?, 79 Wash. U. L. Q. 569, 576–77 (2001). 
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often moves to dismiss the suit “and, if the board appears to have acted 
independently and to have conducted a reasonable investigation of the 
allegations in the plaintiff’s complaint, a court will generally grant this 
motion.”137
Excusing demand, also known as demand futility, is an exceptionally 
difficult task for shareholders. Plaintiffs must be able to plead with 
particularity why demand would have been futile.
 
138 Where there are 
allegations that the directors made a conscious business decision in 
breach of their fiduciary duties, as is the case if a say-on-pay vote has 
been ignored, plaintiffs must typically satisfy the test established by the 
Delaware Supreme Court in Aronson v. Lewis.139 This “requires that the 
plaintiff allege particularized facts creating a reason to doubt that ‘(1) the 
directors are disinterested and independent [or] (2) the challenged 
transaction was otherwise the product of a valid exercise of business 
judgment.’”140 To make matters more difficult more for plaintiffs, they 
must satisfy this burden “without the benefit of discovery.”141
In order to show that a director is “interested,” the plaintiff must 
allege with particularity that the director “will be materially affected, 
either to his benefit or detriment, by a decision of the board, in a manner 
not shared by the corporation and the stockholders.”
 
142 To show that a 
director lacks independence, the plaintiff must also allege with 
particularity that the director cannot “base his decision ‘on the corporate 
merits of the subject before the board rather than extraneous 
considerations or influences.’”143 To satisfy the first prong of the Aronson 
test in a derivative suit challenging executive compensation, “[t]he 
plaintiff’s best hope is to show that a majority of the board of directors is 
financially interested in the compensation decision.”144
 
 137. Id. 
 However, it is 
 138. See Fed R. Civ. P. 23.1(b)(3) (the plaintiffs must “state with particularity: (A) any effort by 
the plaintiff to obtain the desired action from the directors or comparable authority and, if necessary, 
from the shareholders or members; and (B) the reasons for not obtaining the action or not making the 
effort”); see also Del. Ch. Ct. R. 23.1(a) (2013) (“The complaint shall also allege with particularity the 
efforts, if any, made by the plaintiff to obtain the action the plaintiff desires from the directors or 
comparable authority and the reasons for the plaintiff’s failure to obtain the action or for not making 
the effort.”). Courts apply the requirements of demand futility as established by the law of the state of 
incorporation. Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., 500 U.S. 90, 108–09 (1991). Hence, Delaware law is 
often applied in derivative suits in both federal and state courts, including outside of Delaware. 
 139. See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 814 (Del. 1984); Wood v. Baum, 953 A.2d 136, 140 (Del. 
2008); see also RCM Sec. Fund, Inc. v. Stanton, 928 F.2d 1318, 1330 (2d Cir. 1991) (applying the 
Aronson test). 
 140. Wood, 953 A.2d at 140 (quoting Aronson, 473 A.2d at 814). The plaintiff may satisfy either 
prong of the Aronson test to establish demand futility. Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 256 (Del. 2000). 
 141. Thomas & Martin, supra note 136, at 587. 
 142. Seminaris v. Landa, 662 A.2d 1350, 1354 (Del. Ch. 1995) (citing Rales v. Blasband, 634 A.2d 
927, 936 (Del. 1993)). 
 143. Id. (quoting Aronson, 473 A.2d at 816). 
 144. Thomas & Martin, supra note 136, at 577. 
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extremely unlikely that a plaintiff can successfully make this showing. 
This is because “[m]any public corporations have compensation 
committees comprised mostly, if not exclusively, of disinterested outside 
directors. The effect of such a committee is that it will often erect an 
unsurpassable barrier in the plaintiff’s quest to challenge executive 
compensation.”145
To satisfy the second prong of the Aronson test, the plaintiff’s 
allegations must be able to rebut the business judgment rule. The business 
judgment rule “is a presumption that in making a business decision the 
directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in 
the honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the 
company.”
 
146 A plaintiff can rebut the business judgment rule “by 
alleging with particularity that a director knowingly violated a fiduciary 
duty or failed to act in violation of a known duty to act, demonstrating a 
conscious disregard for her duties.”147 Alternatively, the plaintiff can 
rebut the presumption by placing into doubt that the directors’ decisions 
were made as part of a rational decision, in which they “availed 
themselves of all material and reasonably available information.”148
Rebutting the business judgment rule provides shareholder plaintiffs 
the strongest approach in incorporating say-on-pay votes into their 
complaint. The votes represent the desire of the shareholders to whom 
directors owe a fiduciary duty of loyalty, and failure to consider voting 
results strongly suggests that the directors failed to avail themselves of 
material and reasonably available information. This Part focuses on 
plaintiffs’ ability to use a failed say-on-pay vote to support demand futility. 
Due to the advisory nature of a say-on-pay vote, however, courts have 
been reluctant to conclude that the directors’ failure to consider a negative 
say-on-pay vote amounts to the directors consciously disregarding their 
fiduciary duties. 
 
B. Results of Say-on-Pay Derivative Suits 
So far, shareholders have brought a handful of derivative suits against 
the board of directors, senior executives, and compensation consultants 
over failed votes.149
 
 145. Id. at 577–78 (quotation marks omitted). 
 The suits allege “that the ‘No’ votes reflected the 
‘independent business judgment’ of shareholders that the pay was not in 
the interest of their firms and they attacked the compensation decisions as 
breaches of the duties of loyalty and good faith owed by corporate 
 146. Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812. 
 147. In re Citigroup Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106, 125 (Del. Ch. 2009). 
 148. Id. at 124; see Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 259 (Del. 2000) (“The Board is responsible for 
considering only material facts that are reasonably available, not those that are immaterial or out of 
the Board’s reasonable reach.” (emphasis omitted)). 
 149. Nelson II, supra note 132, at 156. 
M - Truong_10 (TEIXEIRA) (Do Not Delete) 5/26/2014 10:52 AM 
1212 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 65:1191 
officials to their shareholders.”150 So far, only one suit has managed to 
survive a motion to dismiss.151
1. Cincinnati Bell 
 
In NECA-IBEW Pension Fund ex. rel. Cincinnati Bell, Inc. v. Cox, 
the board of directors approved pay raises and bonuses for its top three 
executives in 2010 despite the company suffering “a $61.3 million dollar 
decline in net income, a drop in earnings per share from $0.37 to $0.09, a 
reduction in share price from $3.45 to $2.80, and a negative 18.8% annual 
shareholder return.”152 After approving the package, the directors sought 
shareholder approval of the 2010 compensation package in its 2011 
proxy.153 Subsequently, approximately two-thirds of the voting 
shareholders rejected the 2010 package in the proxy vote.154 Citing this 
overwhelming rejection of the compensation package, the plaintiffs filed 
a derivative suit alleging that the board breached its fiduciary duty of 
loyalty when it approved pay raises and bonuses for company executives 
in a year for which the company performed dismally.155
The Ohio district court denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss, 
determining that the plaintiffs sufficiently alleged demand futility as well 
as claims for breach of fiduciary duty and unjust enrichment.
 
156
Given that the director defendants devised the challenged 
compensation, approved the compensation, recommended shareholder 
approval of the compensation, and suffered a negative shareholder 
vote on the compensation, plaintiff has demonstrated sufficient facts to 
show that there is reason to doubt these same directors could exercise 
their independent business judgment over whether to bring suit against 
themselves for breach of fiduciary duty in awarding the challenged 
compensation.
 With 
regard to demand futility, the court found that: 
157
Accordingly, the court held that a failed say-on-pay vote was sufficient to 
rebut the business judgment rule. However, as discussed below, courts 
have overwhelmingly rejected the analysis in Cincinnati Bell. 
 
 
 150. Daniel J. Morrissey, Executive Compensation and Income Equality, 4 Wm. & Mary Bus. L. 
Rev. 1, 29 (2013). 
 151. NECA-IBEW Pension Fund ex rel. Cincinnati Bell, Inc. v. Cox, No. 1:11-451, 2011 WL 
4383368, at *5 (S.D. Ohio. Sept. 20, 2011). 
 152. Id. at *1. 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. at *3–5. 
 157. Id. at *4. 
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2. Plaintiffs’ Lack of Success in Other Cases 
In most other cases, plaintiffs have failed to survive the motion to 
dismiss stage.158
Under Dodd-Frank, the Board had no obligation to reevaluate its 
executive compensation plan in light of the shareholders’ vote. 
Additionally, Dodd-Frank explicitly prohibits construing the 
shareholder vote as “overruling” the Board’s compensation decision. 
Accordingly, the Board’s failure to change course in light of the say-
on-pay vote does not give rise to a substantial likelihood of personal 
liability, nor demonstrate that the Board would have been unable 
objectively to evaluate a demand to bring suit.
 Courts have focused on the advisory nature of the 
statutory language of Dodd-Frank that expressly states that the vote does 
not create a fiduciary duty on the directors, with one court stating: 
159
As such, courts have consistently determined that a failed say-on-
pay vote alone does not rebut the presumption of the business judgment 
rule that applies to directors’ compensation decisions.
 
160 One court has 
concluded that “a shareholder vote on executive compensation under the 
Act has substantial evidentiary weight and may be used as evidence by a 
court in determining whether the second prong of the Aronson test has 
been met.”161
In many cases in which plaintiffs filed derivative suits shortly after 
the failed vote, courts have routinely concluded that because the vote 
was not held until after the decision to approve the compensation 
packages, the directors could not have considered the votes in their 
 But it is clear from the various courts’ decisions that a say-
on-pay vote can be utilized only if it is one of a larger body of allegations 
against a board of directors. 
 
 158. But cf. Boxer v. Accuray Inc., 906 F. Supp. 2d 1012, 1017 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (granting the 
plaintiffs’ motion to remand the case to state court). Similarly, in Dennis v. Hart, No. 11-2271, 2012 
WL 33199 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 6, 2012), the district court—while partially dismissing the plaintiff’s claim—
also granted the plaintiffs’ motion to remand. Id. at *5. 
 159. Raul v. Rynd, 929 F. Supp. 2d 333, 346 (D. Del. 2013). 
 160. See, e.g., Robinson Family Trust v. Greig, No. 5:12-1713, 2013 WL 1943330, at *5 (N.D. Ohio 
May 10, 2013); Laborers’ Local v. Intersil, 868 F. Supp. 2d 838, 849 (N.D. Cal. 2012); Swanson v. Weil, No. 
11-2142, 2012 WL 4442795, at *10 (D. Colo. Sept. 26, 2012); Gordon v. Goodyear, No. 12-369, 2012 WL 
2885695, at *10 (N.D. Ill. July 13, 2012); Iron Workers Local No. 25 Pension Fund ex rel. Monolithic 
Power Sys., Inc. v. Bogart, No. 11-4604, 2012 WL 2160436, at *4 (N.D. Cal. June 13, 2012); Plumbers 
Local No. 137 Pension Fund v. Davis, Civ. No. 03:11-633, 2012 WL 104776, at *8 (D. Or. Jan. 11, 2012); 
Charter Twp. of Clinton Police & Fire Ret. Sys. v. Martin, 162 Cal. Rptr. 3d 300, 313–14 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2013); see also Weinberg ex rel. BioMed Realty Trust, Inc. v. Gold, 838 F. Supp. 2d 355, 361 (D. Md. 2012) 
(finding that, while “a ‘say on pay’ vote may be reasonably considered as a factor in the demand futility 
analysis, it is not conclusive in this case”); Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 263 (Del. 2000) (“It is the 
essence of business judgment for a board to determine if a particular individual warrant[s] large amounts 
of money, whether in the form of current salary or severance provisions.”) (quoting Grimes v. Donald, 
673 A.2d 1207, 1217 (Del. 1996)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 161. Intersil, 868 F. Supp. 2d at 849. The district court then went on to state, “the shareholder vote 
alone is not enough to rebut the presumption of the business judgment rule. Additional facts are 
required for plaintiff to raise a reasonable doubt that the decision was not a valid exercise of business 
judgment.” Id. 
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decisionmaking.162 One court noted that, under Delaware law, plaintiffs 
could not “us[e] events subsequent to the challenged action to second 
guess a board’s business judgment.”163 More commonly, courts reason 
that “the outcome of the vote . . . does not suggest that, in making those 
decisions, the directors failed to act on an informed basis, in good faith, 
and in the honest belief that the decisions were in [the plaintiff’s] best 
interests.”164
Courts that dismissed the derivative suits have also made concerted 
efforts to distinguish Cincinnati Bell. One court went so far as to state 
that “it is unlikely that the case remains viable legal authority.”
 However, such a conclusion directly conflicts with the 
reasoning set forth in Cincinnati Bell. 
165 But the 
primary way that courts have distinguished cases is by noting that 
Cincinnati Bell involved the application of Ohio law, while most other 
cases applied Delaware law.166 As one court noted, “[u]nder Ohio law, 
the business judgment rule is an affirmative defense, not an element of 
excusing a demand on the Board. . . . As such, courts applying Ohio law 
do not analyze the business judgment rule at the motion to dismiss 
stage.”167
 
 162. See, e.g., Davis, 2012 WL 104776, at *7; Swanson, 2012 WL 4442795, at *12; Teamsters Local 
237 v. McCarthy, No. 2011-197841, 2011 WL 4836230, at *10 (Ga. Super. Sep. 16, 2011). 
 This appears to be a somewhat disingenuous way in which 
courts have distinguished Cincinnati Bell because the court there 
expressly stated that there was “reason to doubt” that the directors could 
 163. Swanson, 2012 WL 4442795, at *11. 
 164. McCarthy, 2011 WL 4836230, at *10–11. 
 165. Davis, 2012 WL 104776, at *8. The court noted that “Cincinnati Bell’s holding was recently 
called into question in light of the court’s apparent lack of subject matter jurisdiction and, as that court 
found particularly troubling, the plaintiff’s failure to disclose contrary authority in response to the 
court’s specific inquiry.” Id. at *5. Another court observed that the Cincinnati Bell court “also relied 
on the fact that all of the directors were named defendants in the action. The court relied on dicta from 
two Ohio cases suggesting that naming all members of the board of directors as defendants may be 
sufficient to excuse the pre-suit demand requirement.” Greig, 2013 WL 1943330, at *6. The Greig court 
concluded that the Ohio Supreme Court would not have found that naming all of the members of a 
board would be sufficient to excuse the demand requirement in light of existing Delaware law, on 
which Ohio courts frequently rely in derivative actions. Id. 
 166. See, e.g., Robinson Family Trust v. Greig, No. 5:12-1713, 2013 WL 1943330, at *6 (N.D. Ohio 
May 10, 2013); Swanson v. Weil, No. 11-02142, 2012 WL 4442795, at *7 (D. Colo. Sept. 26, 2012); 
Gordon v. Goodyear, No. 12-369, 2012 WL 2885695, at *10–11 (N.D. Ill. July 13, 2012); Iron Workers 
Local No. 25 Pension Fund ex rel. Monolithic Power Sys., Inc. v. Bogart, No. 11-4604, 2012 WL 
2160436, at *4 n.44 (N.D. Cal. June 13, 2012). The BioMed court applied Maryland law and noted that 
neither Delaware nor Ohio standards for demand futility were comparable. Weinberg ex rel. BioMed 
Realty Trust, Inc. v. Gold, 838 F. Supp. 2d 355, 361 (D. Md. 2012). The court found that by applying 
either the Maryland or Delaware standard, it would arrive at the same conclusion despite having 
different standards for demand futility. Id. at 362. 
 167. Gordon, 2012 WL 2885695, at *10–11. The Cincinnati Bell court stated that “[w]hen plaintiffs 
allege a breach of fiduciary duty, the business judgment rule would impose on plaintiffs a burden at 
trial to present evidence to rebut the presumption the rule imposes. However, plaintiffs are not 
likewise obligated to plead operative facts in their complaint that would rebut the presumption.” 
NECA-IBEW Pension Fund ex rel. Cincinnati Bell, Inc. v. Cox, No. 1:11-451, 2011 WL 4383368, at *2 
(S.D. Ohio. Sept. 20, 2011). 
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have exercised their independent business judgment.168
C. Analysis and Recommendations 
 But be discussed 
below, the court used dubious reasoning in considering the say-on-pay 
vote, and it stands to reason that plaintiffs should not rely on Cincinnati 
Bell to support future actions. 
So far, courts have been unsympathetic to plaintiffs’ use of failed 
say-on-pay votes to rebut the business judgment rule. This does not 
suggest, however, that the business judgment rule will always protect 
directors’ decisions on executive compensation in the face of a failed 
vote. Delaware courts have indicated that there are limits to the 
protection that the business judgment rule provides. Delaware law 
recognizes that directors “have the authority and broad discretion to 
make executive compensation decisions.”169 However, that discretion “is 
not unlimited. Indeed, the Delaware Supreme Court was clear when it 
stated that ‘there is an outer limit’ to the board’s discretion to set 
executive compensation, ‘at which point a decision of the directors on 
executive compensation is so disproportionately large as to be 
unconscionable and constitute waste.’”170
A failed say-on-pay vote, particularly a vote that relied on a proxy 
advisor’s recommendation to reject a board’s pay proposal, should be 
sufficient to rebut the business judgment rule and excuse pre-suit demand 
for a derivative suit. Proxy advisors are able to aggregate information that 
investors find important in determining how to vote.
 Courts, then, should consider a 
say-on-pay vote as an effective means of preventing boards from abusing 
their discretion in setting compensation packages. 
171 In determining 
recommendations for say-on-pay votes, I.S.S. examines “CEO pay and 
performance; problematic pay practices; communication and 
responsiveness to shareholders; the performance metrics used in 
incentive plans; the use of peer groups in benchmarking executive pay; 
and the balance of performance and non-performance-based pay.”172
 
 168. Cincinnati Bell, 2011 WL 4383368, at *4. 
 
This indicates that shareholders rely on a wealth of information in 
making their vote, and when they vote against the directors’ pay 
 169. In re Citigroup Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106, 138 (Del. Ch. 2009). 
 170. Id. (quoting Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 262 n.56 (Del. 2000)). 
 171. See Choi et al., supra note 122, at 696–97. 
 172. Larcker et al., supra note 119, at 2 (citing Institutional Shareholder Services 2011 Voting 
Policies, Institutional Shareholder Services, http://www.issgovernance.com/policy/2011/ 
policy_information (last visited Apr. 24, 2014). Glass Lewis, another proxy firm considers the following 
in making their recommendations: “[T]he overall design and structure of the company’s executive 
compensation program, including performance metrics; the quality and content of the company’s 
disclosure; the amount paid to executives; and the link between compensation and performance as 
indicated by the company’s current and past pay-for-performance grades.” Id. 
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proposal, they do so based on information that is “material and 
reasonably available” to the directors.173
This does not mean that a failed say-on-pay vote should always be 
considered sufficient to establish demand futility. In fact, the cases so far 
in which the courts dismissed for failure to establish demand futility 
came to the correct conclusion. The Cincinnati Bell court stated that 
because the directors submitted their executive pay proposal to vote and 
asked for shareholder support, and subsequently saw their proposal 
rejected by the shareholders, “there is reason to doubt these same 
directors could exercise their independent business judgment over whether 




Still, there are institutionalized obstacles that inhibit courts’ ability 
to consider the say-on-pay votes at the motion for dismissal stage. Courts 
have generally been reluctant to intervene in executive compensation 
disputes, citing concerns about lack of competence to consider 
compensation decisions.
 But this cannot be the case. Although 
directors may not have been able to exercise their business judgment in 
considering the “no” vote, they also did not have the opportunity to do 
so. Thus, shareholders are not suing because the directors failed to 
exercise their business judgment; rather, they are suing based on the 
benefits of hindsight. Shareholders should only be able to use say-on-pay 
votes as the basis of demand futility when at least one of two criteria are 
present: (1) particularized allegations that there was dialogue between 
directors and shareholders after the failed vote, and the directors then 
chose to ignore shareholder input; or (2) a second consecutive failed vote, 
which provides strong evidence that the directors deliberately ignored 
shareholders in choosing to approve a pay proposal. 
175 But as some commentators have noted, such 
concerns have little empirical support as courts regularly determine 
complex issues, including those in corporate law.176
 
 173. In re Citigroup, 964 A.2d at 124. 
 And as demonstrated 
in Brehm v. Eisner, courts have shown willingness to scrutinize directors’ 
decisions on compensation when executive pay pushes toward excessive 
 174. Cincinnati Bell, 2011 WL 4383368, at *4. 
 175. See Thomas & Martin, supra note 136, at 601–02. Thomas and Martin summarized the 
argument as follows: “Boards of directors are better suited than courts for making determinations 
about the appropriate levels of executive compensation. Directors are more knowledgeable than 
judges about their companies’ needs and the market for executive talent. They, not the courts, should 
be responsible for determining the pay levels of officers.” See id. at 602; see also Bebchuk & Fried, Pay 
Without Performance, supra note 16, at 45 (“Courts are simply ill equipped to judge the desirability 
of compensation packages and policies.”). 
 176. See, e.g., Bebchuk & Fried, Pay Without Performance, supra note 16, at 45; Charles M. 
Yablon, Overcompensating: The Corporate Lawyer and Executive Pay, 92 Colum. L. Rev. 1867, 1896 
n.79 (1992) (reviewing Graef Crystal, In Search of Excess: the Overcompensation of American 
Executives (1991)). 
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levels.177 To the contrary, courts are perhaps “best positioned to police 
abuses of the executive compensation process.”178
Accordingly, courts should apply stricter standards of judicial review 
when directors ignore failed say-on-pay votes.
 
179
At least one Delaware chancellor has suggested that the Delaware 
courts should apply enhanced scrutiny in such situations.
 Where a shareholder’s 
complaint alleges demand futility on the basis of a failed vote, the burden 
should be placed on the board to show that they properly considered the 
vote and its implications. If the board declined to take shareholder’s 
input into account in a subsequent pay proposal, then the board must be 
able to show that executives were compensated reasonably. The board 
may provide evidence that compares the pay proposal to other 
compensation packages paid out to executives at comparable corporations. 
The board may also show evidence that the pay was justified on the basis 
of the executives’ job performance. Absent such a showing, courts should 
deny the board’s motion to dismiss. 
180 However, 
that same chancellor had strong concerns that such a new standard of 
review would result in a revolt against the courts that occurred as a result 
of Smith v. Van Gorkom,181
 
 177. Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 249 (Del. 2000). In Brehm, plaintiffs brought a breach of 
fiduciary duty claim against the board of directors at the Walt Disney Company for approving an 
“extravagant and wasteful” compensation package for former president of the company, Michael S. 
Ovitz. Id. at 248–49. As president of Disney, Ovitz was paid “a base salary of $1 million per year, a 
discretionary bonus, and two sets of stock options . . . that collectively would enable Ovitz to purchase 
5 million shares of Disney common stock.” Id. at 250. Additionally, Ovitz would be paid $10 million if 
Disney declined to retain him at the end of his five-year term. Id. If Ovitz was terminated without 
cause—that is, he did not resign voluntarily or commit gross negligence or malfeasance—Ovitz would 
be paid the remainder of his salary owed to him at the end of the five-year term, an additional 
“$10 million severance payment, an additional $7.5 million for each fiscal year remaining under the 
agreement, and the immediate vesting of the first 3 million stock options.” Id. According to the 
Delaware Supreme Court, “the compensation and termination payout for Ovitz were exceedingly 
lucrative, if not luxurious, compared to Ovitz’s value to the Company; and . . . the processes of the 
boards of directors in dealing with the approval and termination of the Ovitz Employment Agreement 
were casual, if not sloppy and perfunctory.” Id. at 249. The court went on to note that “the sheer size 
of the payout to Ovitz, as alleged, pushes the envelope of judicial respect for the business judgment of 
directors in making compensation decisions.” See id.; see also Thomas & Wells, supra note 30, at 876–
77 (citing In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 825 A.2d 275, 289 (Del. Ch. 2003)) (arguing that the 
chancery court’s ruling on remand “could be read to mean that directors who knowingly acted without 
adequate information and deliberation in approving an executive compensation package had failed to 
satisfy their fiduciary duty to act in good faith”). 
 the infamous case that enabled directors to 
 178. Thomas & Martin, supra note 136, at 604. 
 179. Many commenters have argued for enhanced scrutiny in cases involving executive 
compensation. See, e.g., id. at 603–05; Yablon, supra note 176, at 1899–1900; Detlev Vagts, Challenges 
to Executive Compensation: For the Markets or the Courts?, 8 J. Corp. L. 231, 252–61 (1983). 
 180. See Gordon Smith, The Business Associations Section, Conglomerate (Jan. 6, 2012), 
http://www.theconglomerate.org/2012/01/the-business-associations-section.html. 
 181. Id. 
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be liable for monetary damages even where they acted in good faith.182 
Therefore, one commentator opined that the likelihood of Delaware 
courts doing so was unlikely “absent a big shift in the debate on executive 
compensation.”183
A Van Gorkom-like revolt would likely not occur here. In the past, 
courts have applied heightened scrutiny to consider directors’ decisions 
on executive compensation with little fanfare.
 
184 In addition, fears that 
added scrutiny after a failed say-on-pay vote will lead to a sharp rise in 
litigation have little support.185 As previously noted, only four companies 
have so far had two consecutive failed votes. The incentive for directors to 
respond after a vote, in order to appease shareholders and mitigate the 
consequences of public scrutiny, is too great. Further, the derivative suits 
that would actually be decided on the merits will allow courts to develop 
a set of best practices that would better guide companies on how to 
properly respond after a failed vote to avoid potential litigation.186
While the potential of an increase in frivolous litigation should be a 
concern, the increase of litigation is not necessarily a problem. The threat 
of lawsuit, especially one that could be decided on the merits, provides a 
strong incentive for directors to carefully consider a failed say-on-pay 
vote. As Yablon noted, “[m]ost legal regulation of corporate behavior 
does not take place in court, but in lawyers’ offices, as corporate lawyers 
counsel their clients as to what they must do to avoid legal ‘problems’ in 




 182. In Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985), the Supreme Court of Delaware held that 
Trans Union’s directors were grossly negligent in breaching their duty of care when they failed to 
consider the CEO’s merger proposal. Id. at 881. In so doing, the court required directors to fully assess 
information prior to making decisions in their fiduciary capacity; otherwise directors could be found to 
be violating their duty of care, regardless of whether they acted in good faith. Id. at 872–73. The result 
significantly increased the risk of liability for directors, prompting insurance companies to raise 
corporate insurance rates. Hillary A. Sale, Delaware’s Good Faith, 89 Cornell L. Rev. 456, 466 n.58 
(2004). “Corporate lawyers and managers also complained loudly and the specter of a crisis in quality 
board directors emerged.” Id.; see Daniel R. Fischel, The Business Judgment Rule and the Trans Union 
Case, 40 Bus. L. 1437, 1455 (1985) (referring to Van Gorkom as “one of the worst decisions in the 
history of corporate law”). As a direct result of the case, “the Delaware legislature amended the 
Delaware General Corporation Law to allow for an optional charter provision to exculpate directors 
for violations of the duty of due care.” Sale, supra note 
 And in “the area of 
executive compensation, increased litigation risk may have the salutary 
182, at 466 (citing Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, 
§ 102(b)(7) (2012)); see also Stephen A. Radin, The Director’s Duty of Care Three Years After Smith v. 
Van Gorkom, 39 Hastings L.J. 707, 747–48 (1988) (finding that by the end of 1987, twenty-seven 
states enacted statutes modeled after section 102(b)(7)). 
 183. See Smith, supra note 180. 
 184. Thomas & Wells, supra note 30, at 880. 
 185. See Yablon, supra note 176, at 1901 (explaining that litigation challenging executive 
compensation “is likely to involve rather uncertain and fairly low damages”). 
 186. See Thomas & Wells, supra note 30, at 895 (noting that during the 1980s and 1990s, courts 
“developed special procedures for boards to follow when selling companies to managers or controlling 
shareholders”). 
 187. Yablon, supra note 176, at 1897. 
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effect of giving corporate counsel greater incentive to restrain executive 
overcompensation.”188
Conclusion 
 Thus, litigation merely enforces the purposes of 
say-on-pay by providing shareholders a forum to express their opinions on 
a company’s pay policies through voting and inducing directors to practice 
restraint when determining and approving executive pay packages. 
Since say-on-pay voting became mandatory in 2011, the voting results 
have not shown a major upheaval in executive pay, as some had hoped. 
However, the first three years of say-on-pay, while not yet impacting the 
amount that executives are paid, have suggested that shareholders have 
had a significant effect on how executives are paid. Moreover, the first 
three years of voting have strongly indicated that shareholders are taking 
their votes seriously and companies are listening to their shareholders on 
pay matters. However, due to the advisory nature of the vote, say-on-pay 
does not provide shareholders with any effective means of recourse when 
directors fail to consider the shareholders’ votes, thereby limiting the 
effectiveness of say-on-pay in the long term. In order to strengthen 
shareholders’ ability to bring suits against directors, and therefore make 
say-on-pay a more effective mechanism in controlling executive 
compensation, courts should apply a higher standard of scrutiny when 






















 188. Id. at 1902. 
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